ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES IN THE ALLOCATION AND MANAGEMENT OF WESTERN INTERSTATE RIVERS Reed D. Benson'
This special issue focuses on a range of topics relating to Great Lakes water and the environment, including the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact (Great Lakes Compact). This interstate agreement, approved by Congress in 2008,2 represents one of the more important recent developments in water policy, not just in the Great Lakes, but nationally as well. 3 There are many interstate water compacts, primarily in the western United States, 4 but the Great Lakes Compact is unique. From a western perspective, what makes this new compact so unusual is that it actually restricts diversions for consumptive uses for purposes of protecting the Great Lakes environment. The western compacts essentially take the opposite approach, emphasizing old-school water development and use, while mostly ignoring environmental matters. 6 In practice, the water development favored by these compacts-chiefly in the form of large federal water projects-sharply altered western river ecosystems, resulting in serious environmental problems. These problems have not prompted changes in the compacts (or Supreme Court decrees) that formally allocate interstate waters among the western states. But largely because of the requirements of the Endangered Species Act (ESA), environmental issues have indeed become a factor in the management of western interstate rivers.
This essay briefly examines environmental issues in the allocation and management of western interstate rivers. Part I provides background on interstate water allocation in the West, on western water projects built by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (the Bureau), and on the resulting environmental problems facing western rivers. Part II examines one Supreme Court decree and two compacts apportioning the waters of three western rivers, to illustrate how interstate water allocation has addressedor more accurately, not addressed-environmental concerns. Part III explains how the need for ESA compliance has influenced the management of these three western rivers, and considers the relationship between these environmental developments and the compacts and decrees that formally allocate interstate waters.
I. ALLOCATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE WATER OF

INTERSTATE RIVERS
This section provides a short overview of the standard legal mechanisms-Supreme Court decrees and, more commonly, interstate compacts-for allocating the water of rivers shared by two or more states. It then very briefly explains how interstate rivers were "developed" through major federal water projects built in the 20th century, and how this development contributed to significant environmental problems, including impacts to river-dependent species that are now protected by the ESA.
A. Interstate Water Allocation: Supreme Court Decrees and Interstate Compacts
The western United States has many rivers that form or cross state boundaries, and many of these rivers have been formally apportioned among the states that share them-that is, the waters of these rivers have been allocated among the states under a recognized legal mechanism. The principal approach is the interstate compact, a negotiated agreement that becomes both state and federal law upon ratification by the relevant state legislatures and Congress, respectively. 9 In the absence of a compact, the U.S. Supreme Court may divide the waters of an interstate river under the doctrine of equitable apportionment.o A third approach, Congressional the federal government as well), charged with administering the compact.
Nearly all of the west's water compacts date from the 1920s through the 1950s, with most enacted after 1945.21 It is no mere coincidence that the boom in interstate compact formation was happening at around the same time as the boom in federal water project construction. 22 As stated by one authority, It has been suggested that " [m] ost compacts represent compromises reached by the water resource establishments of the signatory states against a background of urgent need (or at least desire) for federal benefits that are contingent upon agreement being reached." . . . The federal benefits typically were the funding and building of water development projects using interstate waters, projects that by common understanding were not likely to be funded by Congress absent agreement by the affected states regarding allocation of the interstate waters. 23 In other words, the states were motivated to enter water compacts largely in hopes of securing authorization and funding for major federal water projects, and Congress delivered dozens of such projects in the middle part of the 20th century. As interstate compacts shaped the legal landscape on many of the western United States' rivers, federal agencies-especially the Bureau of Reclamation-altered the physical landscape. Congress launched the federal reclamation program in 1902, enacting a statute 2 5 that authorized the Interior Secretary to build "irrigation works for the storage, diversion, and development of waters" 26 in the western states and territories. As originally conceived, these projects would supply irrigation water to farmers who would settle on designated lands and "reclaim" them for irrigated agriculture, repaying the government's construction costs over a ten-year period.
27 By 1939, Congress had recognized that reclamation projects could serve multiple purposes, including hydropower, flood control, navigation, municipal water supply, and other "miscellaneous purposes." 2 8 As stated by historian Donald Pisani, "[n]ot until the 1930s, when the 'High Dam Era' gave the bureau responsibilities for providing water to cities as well as farms, did it become the most important federal agency in the West. From 1930 to 1970 the water and power provided by the bureau transformed the region .... 29 The Bureau today operates over 330 dams, storing and releasing water for irrigation, hydropower, drinking water, and other human uses.
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Operation of these dams, however, creates a variety of serious and ongoing environmental impacts throughout the west. Most notably, reservoir dams. Of these, seventy-seven-nearly three-quarters-were authorized between 1928 and 1956. . . . In that astonishingly brief twenty-eight-year period between the first preparations for Hoover Dam and the passage of the Colorado River Storage Project Act, the most fateful transformation that has ever been visited on any landscape, anywhere, was wrought. flows, often damaging aquatic ecosystems and harming native species. Indeed, a 1996 study of counties in the western United States "found that the number of ESA-listed fish species in a county correlated positively with the level of irrigated agriculture reliant on surface water in the county. In particular, the number of species depended positively on water-supply levels of the Bureau of Reclamation."
The ESA has become a significant factor in the operation of several Bureau projects, not only because the operation of many projects affects protected species and their habitats, but also because § 7 of the ESA 348 (1996) . The Bureau, however, was not the only federal agency to build major water projects that would transform western rivers. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers also played its part, and Marc Reisner's CADILLAc DESERT described the Corps' historic competition with the Bureau over projects in a chapter memorably titled "Rivals in Crime." Reisner, supra note 24, at ch. 6. The Corps' primary mission in building and operating dams has been flood control, but the Corps' floodcontrol operations have sometimes been the focus of major disputes. On the Missouri River, where the Corps operates a system of dams that affect a variety of uses in several states, there was intense litigation in the mid-2000s on a range of issues including impacts on endangered species. See In re Operation of Mo. River Sys. Litig., 421 F.3d 618 (8th Cir.
2005).
requires all federal agencies to "insure" that their actions are "not likely to jeopardize the continued existence" of any listed species. 33 This command has forced the Bureau to change the way it operates some projects, including providing more water for species while cutting deliveries to irrigators who have water supply contracts with the Bureau. 34 The Klamath Basin water crisis, where many farmers on one of the oldest reclamation projects lost nearly their entire water supply in drought year 2001, was perhaps the most intense dispute.
3 ' The nation's hottest endangered species conflict today involves the federal Central Valley Project in California, pitting the needs of endangered salmon and Delta smelt against traditional water uses, primarily irrigation.
36 ESA requirements in the Central Valley have been heavily litigated for two decades, 37 and the cases show no sign of 38 stopping.
Thus, the mandate in § 7 of the ESA has forced the Bureau to consider environmental factors in operating its projects that affect listed species. Outside this narrow context of federal water projects and endangered species, however, environmental factors have had relatively little effect on the allocation and management of interstate rivers, as the next section discusses.
II. ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES IN WESTERN INTERSTATE WATER
DECREES AND COMPACTS
This section discusses the treatment of environmental issues in the decrees and compacts that apportion the water of interstate rivers. Due to space constraints, this article does not attempt a comprehensive review of the subject, but uses one decree and two compacts to provide an illustrative 33. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2013). 
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look. As shown by the following three river basins, the water of interstate rivers has been allocated with little or no regard for environmental concerns.
A. Equitable Apportionment: the North Platte River
One of the Supreme Court's most important equitable apportionment decisions 39 divided the waters of the North Platte River, primarily between Wyoming and Nebraska. In a factually detailed opinion, the Court apportioned the waters of the North Platte-most importantly, a "pivotal reach" of forty-one river miles ending just below the Wyoming-Nebraska border-allocating 75 percent of irrigation season flows to Nebraska and 25 percent to Wyoming. 40 Outside of those two states, however, this 1945 case is best known for its general statement of the many factors the Court may consider in making an equitable apportionment determination regarding the waters of an interstate river.
4 ' The Court's exhaustive consideration of these factors in Nebraska v. Wyoming, however, focused solely on a single use of water: irrigation. The Court began its opinion by stating, "The controversy pertains to the use for irrigation purposes of the water of the North Platte River,"4 2 and devoted forty pages of factual, legal, and equitable analysis exclusively to irrigation. 43 Thus, despite its famous statement fourteen years earlier in an eastern equitable apportionment case-"[a] river is more than an amenity, it 39. Neb. v. Wyo., 325 U.S. 589 (1945) . 40. Id. at 637-54, 667-69. 41. In allocating water among two states that follow the doctrine of prior appropriation, the Court stated:
So far as possible those established uses should be protected though strict application of the priority rule might jeopardize them. Apportionment calls for the exercise of an informed judgment on a consideration of many factors. Priority of appropriation is the guiding principle. But physical and climatic conditions, the consumptive use of water in the several sections of the river, the character and rate of return flows, the extent of established uses, the availability of storage water, the practical effect of wasteful uses on downstream areas, the damage to upstream areas as compared to the benefits to downstream areas if a limitation is imposed on the former-these are all relevant factors. They are merely an illustrative not an exhaustive catalogue. They indicate the nature of the problem of apportionment and the delicate adjustment of interests which must be made. Id. at 618.
42. Id. at 591. 43. Id. at 616-55. A single paragraph at the end of the opinion mentioned other uses, noting that the parties had agreed that the decree should not limit the use of water for "ordinary and usual domestic and municipal purposes." Id. at 656. The Court agreed and added livestock watering to the list at Wyoming's suggestion. Id.
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[Vol. 24:1 WESTERN INTERSTATE RIVERS is a treasure""-the Court treated the North Platte River solely as a source of input for agricultural production. Half a century later, Nebraska and Wyoming renewed their Supreme Court dispute over the waters of the North Platte. By the 1990s, environmental issues-particularly the need for instream flows to provide habitat for endangered birds along the Central Platte River in Nebraskahad become a major concern for states and water users throughout the basin. 45 In returning to the Supreme Court, Nebraska initially "sought modification of the [1945] decree to make Wyoming and Colorado share the burden of providing instream flows necessary to preserve critical wildlife habitat,"4 6 but the Court denied this motion without explanation. Later, however, the Court ruled that it would consider evidence of environmental injury in Nebraska in deciding whether to enjoin proposed upstream water projects. 48 Because enjoining such projects would require the Court to modify its earlier decree, however, Nebraska would have to show substantial injury (environmental or otherwise) in order to obtain relief, a "far from insignificant" burden. 49 Thus, the Court rejected Wyoming's argument that it should consider only evidence of injury to Nebraska's irrigators, not her wildlife. 50 But, through this limited holding, the Court declined to impose affirmative environmental obligations on the states, allowed Nebraska to introduce environmental evidence only for a limited purpose, and warned that it would not readily grant relief based on environmental injuries.
B. Interstate Compacts: Upper Colorado and Klamath
Many of the western United States' interstate rivers are allocated by compact, but this essay will focus on only two. 3 Among the west's interstate water compacts, these two provide a fair degree of contrast. The Upper Colorado Basin contains some of the most arid parts of the interior west, 4 and despite the popularity of angling in this area (especially for trout), fisheries have not traditionally been a major focus of water management. The Klamath Basin, by contrast, typically receives far more precipitation on average, 56 and has long supported one of the most important salmon fisheries on the West Coast.
The Upper Colorado Compact begins by stating its purposes, the last of which is "to secure the expeditious agricultural and industrial development of the Upper Basin, the storage of water and to protect life and property from floods." 5 This initial statement, by emphasizing water development for a few specified ends, indicates that the compact is not intended to serve environmental (or even recreational) values. Twenty more articles follow the statement of purposes-most famously, an article allocating a specific percentage of the basin's share of water to each of the four stateSS9-but none makes any mention of fish, wildlife, water quality, or recreation. The one non-consumptive use recognized by the compact is 
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[Vol. 24:1 hydropower generation; despite its economic and social value, however, hydropower is "subservient to the use and consumption of water for agricultural and domestic purposes and shall not interfere with or prevent use for such dominant purposes." 60 Based on its plain text, the Upper Colorado Compact clearly prioritizes water development and use for conventional consumptive purposes, subordinates hydropower to these purposes, and simply ignores all others. 6 ' The Klamath Compact has similar priorities but is far less singleminded. For starters, its purpose statement mentions not only consumptive uses, but also hydropower, navigation, and even "the protection and enhancement of fish, wildlife, and recreational resources. 
11(m).
61. A savings provision declares that the compact does not alter the obligations of the United States to Indian tribes or to Mexico, or affect "any rights or powers of the United States of America, its agencies or instrumentalities, in or to the waters of the Upper Colorado River System, or its capacity to acquire rights in and to the use of said waters." Id. at art. XIX(a)-(c).
62. It should come as no surprise that the Klamath Compact recognizes the value of water for fish and wildlife, given the basin's important commercial, tribal, and sport fisheries, and its major national wildlife refuges that provide key habitats for migratory birds. 68 The compact does not actually give much weight to these purposes, in that it prioritizes both existing water rights and new irrigation and domestic uses over " [r] ecreational use, including use for fish and wildlife." 6 9 By specifically addressing these purposes and water quality, however, the Klamath Compact takes a broader view of water resources than many western interstate compacts. The Upper Colorado Compact, by contrast, simply ignores environmental issues-just like many others in the interior west.
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In short, decrees and compacts have allocated the waters of interstate rivers with little to no regard for fish, wildlife, or other environmental values.
7 ' This fact is hardly surprising, given that most western compacts 66. Id. at art. XI.E. This provision also preserves "rights and obligations" under the federal migratory bird laws. There are additional savings clauses regarding Indian water rights, but the only use they specifically address is irrigation. 71. This point does not suggest, however, that compacts and decrees have only negative environmental consequences. To the contrary, to the extent that a compact or decree requires an upstream state to deliver a certain amount or percentage of water in a river to a downstream state, that requirement effectively obligates the upstream state to preserve river flows at the minimum level needed to ensure compliance, resulting in incidental environmental benefits. The author has often hard former Wyoming State Engineer Jeff were enacted well before the "environmental decade" of the 1970s, when Congress enacted most of the landmark national environmental laws. 7 2 just because compacts and decrees failed to address environmental issues, however, does not mean that these issues have no relevance today in the management of western rivers, as the next section explains.
III. ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES IN WESTERN INTERSTATE RIVER MANAGEMENT
A. Examples ofAgreements on River Management for Environmental Purposes
Despite their absence from water compacts and decrees, environmental issues-specifically, the habitat needs of river-dependent species protected by the ESA-have become an increasingly important factor in the management of western interstate rivers. This is true in several river basins, each with its own issues and approach to dealing with them, but there is a strong trend toward multilateral agreements addressing water 73 management and endangered species protection.
Some of the more notable environmental agreements are found in the three basins discussed in the previous sections:
74 the Platte, Upper Colorado, and Klamath. In each of these basins federal water projects operated by the Bureau (along with other water uses) have dramatically altered aquatic ecosystems, and several riverdependent species are now listed as threatened or endangered under the ESA.
The In essence, the Platte River RIP is a cooperative approach to habitat restoration for four ESA-listed species along the river in Nebraska; scientific estimations provide the quantity of river flows and riparian habitat these species require, and the RIP seeks to provide one-third of those quantities in its initial thirteen-year increment.
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While providing long-term environmental gains, the RIP also delivers immediate benefits for water users and managers by ensuring ESA compliance for existing and new water development activities. 80 The program is funded by a combination of state and federal funds (although most of the actual dollars are federal), and steered by a "Governance Committee" involving federal and state officials, water users, and conservation groups. 8 ' Congress provided authority and substantial funding for the Platte RIP in 2008. 82 The arrangements are similar for the Upper Colorado, which has not one but two RIPs: one for most of the Upper Colorado River Basin 83 and another for a major tributary, the San Juan River.M These programs were also established by formal cooperative agreements signed by federal officials and state governors, as well as Indian tribes in the case of the San Juan. 85 As in the Platte, the Upper Colorado and San Juan RIPs serve a dual purpose, offering benefits to listed species and their habitat, while also apportionment decree issued by the U.S. Supreme Court. See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text. The waters of the South Platte Basin are allocated between Colorado and Nebraska under one of the earliest interstate compacts. South Platte River Compact, ch. 46, 44 Stat. 195 (1926) . 87 Finally, these two RIPs have found support and funding on Capitol Hill, even producing a rare moment of bipartisanship in the 112th Congress.
U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, PLATTE RIVER RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT (2006)
[
U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., SAN JUAN RIVER BASIN
RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM: FINAL PROGRAM DOCUMENT [hereinafter SAN JUAN]
The Klamath Basin presents a different story, as ESA compliance in that basin produced years of bitter litigation. Conflict reached a crescendo with the 2001 "water crisis" that saw many farmers on the Bureau of Reclamation's Klamath Project get little or no water, but the disputes had been brewing for years before then, both in and out of court. 89 The following year, a new ten-year plan adopted by the Bush Administration returned water to Klamath Project irrigators, but was implicated in a massive salmon die-off in the Klamath River that September. 90 The 2002 plan produced a fresh round of litigation, wherein courts threw out major elements of the plan. 91 Thus, in the Klamath Basin, environmental issues initially became a key factor in water management through litigation. 92
86. See Benson, supra note 78, at 508-10 (describing purposes of the RIPs), 513-16 (describing recovery actions), and 516-19 (describing how the RIPs ensure that water use and management activities comply with § 7 of the ESA's requirements).
87.
Id. at 512-13 (describing membership of the Upper Colorado RIP Recovery Implementation Committee, which makes decisions by consensus, and the San Juan RIP Coordination Committee, which requires a two-thirds vote for action). 92. Litigation was also the driving force for environmental action in other interstate river basins. In the Columbia-Snake River Basin, where several salmon runs were listed as threatened or endangered in the 1990s, the application of § 7 of the ESA to the Federal Columbia River Power System has been actively litigated for nearly two decades. See, e.g., Idaho Dep't of Fish & Game v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 850 F. Supp. 886, 900 (D. Or. 1994) , vacated as moot, 56 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 1995); Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 839 F. Supp. 2d 1117 (D. Or. 2011) . In the Rio Grande Basin, litigation over the operation of Bureau projects in New Mexico effectively prompted federal action to protect the endangered Rio Grande silvery minnow. In one of the decisions in the silvery minnow litigation, U.S. District Judge Parker-while upholding the government's approach to operating the projects despite its risks to the minnow-still noted the positive impact of bringing the case:
Endangered Fish Recovery Programs Extension
It is my impression that at the time this lawsuit was filed, not much was being done by the federal agencies, or by the other major players with interests in the middle Rio Grande, to confront seriously the hard, difficult issues that had to be addressed in order to protect the minnow, and the river, itself. By filing More recently, however, even the Klamath Basin has given rise to a major negotiated agreement regarding water and endangered species, among other topics. 93 The Klamath Basin Restoration Agreement (KBRA) was the product of three years of negotiations involving federal and state agencies (both Oregon and California), tribes, local governments, water users, and conservation groups. 94 The KBRA was designed to produce "effective and durable solutions" that would restore and sustain natural fish populations throughout the basin, and also ensure reliable water and power supplies for agriculture and other uses. Existing irrigation was not fully protected, however, as the KBRA set limits on water diversions for USBR's Klamath Project that would result in deliveries about one hundred thousand acre-feet less than demand in very dry years.
96 This wide-ranging and detailed agreement 97 also addresses "regulatory assurances" including ESA compliance. 98 The KBRA requires Congressional approval, however, and is currently stalled due to Tea Party opposition 99 and concerns about its $800 million federal price tag. 00 Another collaborative, multilateral effort to address endangered species needs on an interstate river is the Multi-Species Conservation this lawsuit, the Plaintiffs' attorneys got the ball rolling, prompting all interested parties to come up with far-reaching solutions to the problems that once seemed insurmountable. Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 469 F. Supp. 
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Program (MSCP) in the Lower Colorado River Basin."o" The MSCP has been described as "a cooperative effort between Federal and non-federal entities" that serves three purposes: "conserving habitat and working toward the recovery of threatened and endangered species, as well as reducing the likelihood of additional species being listed; accommodating present water diversions and power production and optimizing opportunities for future water and power development . .. ; and providing the basis for incidental take authorizations." 0 2 Thus, the MSCP is designed not only to benefit species and their habitat while allowing for ongoing and future water uses, but also to provide coverage against potential ESA liability for a variety of actors. Efforts to launch the MSCP date to 1995, when the Interior Department and state agency representatives from Arizona, California, and Nevada signed an initial agreement to develop the program.1 0 3 Today the MSCP includes these entities as well as dozens of water and power providers (primarily cities and special districts) in the three Lower Basin states.1
In sum, there are now several established environmental programsprimarily in the form of RIPs or other collaborative efforts-in western interstate river basins, even though the waters of these rivers were legally apportioned among the states with little or no regard for fish, wildlife, or other environmental needs. The next section offers some analysis of these programs in relation to the traditional forms of interstate water allocation.
B. Environmental Efforts in Relation to Interstate Compacts and Decrees
The endangered species initiatives in basins such as the Platte, Colorado, and Klamath, may suggest that the failure of interstate water allocation to address environmental concerns is now a moot point. A closer 
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look at these programs as they relate to interstate compacts and decrees, however, suggests that they are at best a partial solution to the environmental challenges facing western rivers. First, and most obviously, organized environmental efforts on interstate rivers are not equivalent to interstate compacts that have been approved by state legislatures and Congress. These programs do not take the form of new compacts, or even environmental amendments or addenda to existing compacts; they are designed and administered by groups that include stakeholders as well as federal and state entities, not by the compact commissions in the relevant river basins.
105
This separation between the legal and institutional frameworks for interstate water allocation and for endangered species conservation might be unimportant if they were "separate but equal." In practice, however, the conservation programs represent a lower level of commitment than the compacts do. Compacts have the status of both state and federal statutes, but the conservation programs operate under cooperative agreements signed by government officials.'
06 Parties to these agreements may simply be able to withdraw unilaterally,1 0 7 whereas the right to withdraw from an established compact is uncertain at best. 08 Given these factors, and the western states' reliance on their compact rights and apportionments, it is hardly surprising that compacts have not given way to environmental requirements in the allocation and management of interstate waters. To the contrary, compacts are almost invariably seen as a legal constraint on the conservation programs, which are generally set up to operate subject to interstate compacts as well as other existing laws." Perhaps the best that can be said of the compacts is that they have not precluded environmental efforts,112 but have instead left the door open for the formation and operation of conservation programs.
A major shortcoming of these programs, however, is that they are almost entirely geared toward ESA compliance. Thus, protecting endangered species is far and away the most important environmental factor in the management of interstate rivers. This nearly exclusive emphasis on the ESA is a policy problem for several reasons. First, where there are no threatened or endangered species, there is little or no environmental progress; one example is the "Lower" Rio Grande in New Mexico, which has remained dry for months at a time in the reach between Elephant Butte Reservoir and the Texas border. 111. The cooperative agreements establishing the Upper Colorado and San Juan RIPs, supra notes 83, 84, state that they are "subject to" and "intended to be consistent with" all applicable laws, specifically including interstate compacts. See SAN JUAN, supra note 84; COLORADO, supra note 83. The Platte Cooperative Agreement is even more thorough, declaring:
This Program Agreement is subject to and is intended to be consistent with all applicable federal and state laws and interstate compacts and decrees. Nothing in this Agreement or in any of the Program documents attached hereto shall be in any way construed as a modification of an interstate compact or decree or an abrogation or waiver by any state of rights under any such compact or decree.
PLATTE RIVER AGREEMENT, supra note 77, at 3.
112. The exception may be the Lower Colorado River, where a court rejected arguments that the Bureau had a duty to "consult" under § 7 of the ESA on the effect of its project operations on endangered species located in Mexico, holding that the "Law of the River"-including the Colorado River Compact-left the Bureau no operating discretion that it could exercise for the benefit of those species. means that other environmental factors-recreational fisheries, migratory birds, water quality, etc.-may get little or no attention even where listed species exist. Third, if water management is impervious to environmental demands except those backed by the ESA, then conservation groups are forced to turn to the ESA for leverage, creating powerful incentives to pursue new species listings. The ESA has been uniquely effective in motivating cooperative efforts involving western water management, bringing federal agencies, states, and diverse stakeholders together.1 4 A key question for the west, however, is whether environmental improvements in interstate river management can extend beyond the needs of endangered species. A broader, more diversified river restoration effort could benefit the region in many ways, but such an effort seems unlikely without a strong legal mandate, and no existing law has been nearly as influential as the ESA. For their part, western interstate compacts and decrees certainly will not promote ecosystem restoration,"' but the movement towards endangered species conservation suggests that environmental progress may be possible in spite of them.
